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Webinar Follow-up Discussion
Responding to Questions from April 29

Thank you for your thoughtful questions in response to our webinar on April 29, 2025. Following the webinar, Ian Johnstone and Alnoor Ebrahim sat down with Jenny Strakovsky to review the questions that they did not have time to answer during our limited time together. Below are their responses. 

The discussion is divided into three parts, organized by topic. You can listen to the audio recording, read a summary of the conversation, or read the transcript of the conversation. 

Part 1: How is the global world order changing?

Part 3 - Training and Skills
00:00 / 09:40
Summary of Part 1

To begin, Ian and Alnoor discuss the challenges of adapting to a multipolar world order, where different ideologies and leadership styles are emerging. They note that the world is no longer unipolar and is not bipolar (such as if countries were to align with either the US or China on specific issues). They highlight the opportunities for smaller states to leverage their power through coalitions and international institutions.

Exploring how to respond to seismic shifts, Ian emphasizes the importance of consistency in applying international law, despite the challenges of power inequality and variable contexts. Alnoor notes that small states can use their moral persuasion to bring issues to the table, such as climate change, and can play an influential role in conflicts as mediators. This episode also discusses the impact of emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, on the distribution of power in the international system. They highlight the digital divide in cybersecurity and the potential risks and opportunities AI presents. AI has already redefined power in various domains, including elections, military strategy, and business, and we note the need for governments to work closely with businesses to address challenges.

Transcript of Part 1

Jenny StrakovskyHi, everyone. This is Jenny Strakovsky, and I'm here with Alnoor Ebrahim and Ian Johnstone. We're very happy to have the opportunity to follow up on some of your questions from the webinar and address them with a little more thoughtfulness than we were able to do in the limited time last week. Alnoor and Ian, do you want to introduce yourselves?

Ian Johnstone Yeah. Hi, I'm Ian Johnstone, Professor of International Law at the Fletcher School.

Alnoor Ebrahim And I'm Alnoor Ebrahim, Professor of Management at the Fletcher School.

Strakovsky Great, great to have both of you here again today. So, I'm just going to jump right in because we had so many questions during the webinar. And the first question was for Ian.

How does the multipolar world order challenge traditional Western-centric diplomatic models? We had one viewer who said that they saw the growing plurality with different ideologies and leadership styles, especially between East and West, as a sign of a more equal global order. With that in mind, do you think the current tensions between the U.S. and China stem, at least in part, from the U.S. struggling to adapt and accept to this new ideological diversity? And what might a hypothetical new world order look like?

Johnstone Thanks, Jenny, and thank you for that question. That's a challenging one. I think the best way to think about the concept of multipolarity is in comparison to unipolarity and bipolarity, which maybe are a bit more familiar to people. As I suggested in the webinar, the world order is no longer unipolar - if it ever was - certainly not in the way that people imagined at the end of the Cold War.

And nor do I really see it as bipolar which would entail the U.S. and China being the two poles, and then everybody else, somehow feeling compelled to line up with one side or another. But I just don't think that's the world in which we live, and I doubt that's the world into which we're heading. I think it's a much more multipolar world with different poles of power.

And those polls may orient towards either the U.S. or China, but they certainly won't align on everything. You know, Russia is closer to China, obviously. But they will go separate ways from time to time. And same with respect to the European Union and the Europeans closer to the U.S., obviously, but we're already seeing them go their own way on some important issues. And then India is a sort of interesting example of a country that has announced its approach to foreign relations, foreign policy being one of multi-alignment. The idea is that you align with, or form alliances, or cooperate with groups of countries depending on the issue area rather than along broad ideological lines. And we're starting to see that I think with respect to many other countries as well, both in the global north and global south.

So the “New World Order,” impossible to describe, but certainly more fluid than it has been in the past, more multipolar, not bipolar, and with many different countries cooperating with each other and in multiple different ways.

Strakovsky I want to follow up on that with actually the 3rd question in our list, which is also related to different powers. In a context, where the global agenda seems to be determined by bigger powers and “transactional diplomacy, what strategies can small states use for diplomacy and sustainable development?

Johnstone Yeah, that's good. It is a good follow up question. I mean, I think, precisely because we are living in a more pluralistic world order in all sorts of ways, and I described the different ways. It's not only multipolar, but in other ways as well. I do think it actually creates opportunities for smaller states to leverage what power they have, even against the bigger states.

They can build coalitions, for example, and they can use these coalitions to push international institutions in directions which the larger states, the big powers may not necessarily want them to go in. So let me give you a concrete example.

UN Security Council. Classically, an organization dominated by powerful states, five countries: the U.S., U.K., Russia, China, and France all have the veto power.

But increasingly, we're seeing the 10 elected members of the Security Council, the so-called E-10 working together as a bloc, pushing the Security Council to adopt resolutions that at least some of the five permanent members might oppose, and none of them are wildly enthusiastic about. There was a recent resolution on humanitarian exemptions to sanctions regimes, for example which was really driven by the E-10.

And these elected members can be working, consulting with groups of states outside the Security Council in order to sort of maximize their leverage, and an example of, that is, the is the so-called, “A3.” The three African States, who now increasingly consult with the entire African Group 55 States before taking a position in the Security Council. And that means that in a sense, they're speaking for 55 states, and not just for themselves or three states, and that gives them considerable leverage that they certainly wouldn't have on their own.

Ebrahim If I might add to that just another example. If we think about the role of small states in the climate crisis, it’s certainly the small states - Costa Rica, Barbados - island states that have been able to use their powers of moral persuasion to actually bring issues to the table related to climate, because they will be, they are certainly the most affected and certainly the most immediately affected.

And so we're seeing small states there, grouping together to create moral arguments for the effects of climate change, and as a result, the responsibilities of the larger states and actually setting the agenda in some respects on that.

We're also seeing with respect to conflicts such as in the Middle East, small states like Qatar, playing an increasingly influential role as interlocutors, as mediators for helping to address those conflicts in a way that the big states have actually not been able to do.

And so, we're seeing, if we can bring in the language of styles of influence that I used in the webinar, they're using the bridging and attracting styles of influence which are whole types of styles rather than pushing styles, which have more to do with assertion or coercion.

Strakovsky To sort of to shift the conversation towards some of the challenges. How do we respond to selective interpretations of international law?

Johnstone I'm going to take that one, I guess, because I'm the international lawyer here, and something that I've been wrestling with my entire career, including the time that I spent at the UN.

You know, consistency is important and consistent. Application of the law is important in international affairs, just as it is in domestic public affairs. You know the idea that, like trace cases, ought to be treated alike is a fundamental principle of justice. It almost feels like it's sort of instinctively got to be correct. Like cases ought to be treated alike.

Of course – speaking hypothetically – but in the real world of international politics expecting perfect consistency is simply too much. You know. We all know that power matters, and that inequality in power, the distribution of power will inevitably result in inconsistency and double standards, and it would be naive to expect otherwise.

And there is no legal or institutional fix that's going to make that go away. That's going to make it possible to apply the law perfectly consistently all the time to great powers and lesser powers alike? Okay. But that doesn't mean that the rule of law should be abandoned. There is very clear, hard, international law against genocide and we certainly have cases in which the international community failed to stop genocides. It failed to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. But if we insist on consistency, then the logic would say, well, because we failed to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, for the sake of consistency, we shouldn't try to stop genocide anywhere.

And obviously, that's an unsatisfying reaction to the problem of inconsistency and the problem of selective application of international law. And it's the same at the domestic level. By the way, you know, just because we don't stop all murders doesn't mean we throw out the law against murder. Okay?

So you know, at the international level, it's more complicated because most international law isn't enforced in the way that it's enforced at the national level. But it still does serve an important purpose, okay? And I think one of the purposes at a minimum is to try to generate consistency. It's almost an advocacy tool that can be used to put pressure on decision makers, pressure on leaders to treat like cases alike. That's why we have international law. There's a doctrine that some of our listeners may be familiar with called the “responsibility to protect.”

It emerged precisely for the purpose of trying to generate more consistency in responding to mass atrocities. Well, the concept of “R-2-P,” the responsibility to protect, hasn't compelled states to act to stop mass atrocity. It hasn't prevented action when sometimes the concept was abused, when it shouldn't really have been invoked. But it can be used to make it a little more likely that there will be action. There will be intervention when justified, and a little less likely that this will happen when not justified. So, in a sense, it's a tool, an advocacy tool that can be used to stimulate intervention when that would be appropriate.

But to constrain it when it wouldn't be appropriate. So I guess the point in answer to the question is that yes, selective application of the law is a problem. Yes, we ought to do what we can to try to minimize inconsistency in selective application. But we have to be careful not to demand perfect consistency, because if we did, essentially, we would be rendering international law essentially inconsequential. We have to work to try to make it more consistent as opposed to just abandoning it altogether.

Strakovsky Thank you. Shift the focus a little bit to another factor in the international ecosystem, which is technology. What role do you see emerging technology like AI and quantum computing, playing in redefining power in the international system?

Johnstone So let me just sort of big picture here is that you know, there's little doubt that emerging technologies are having a profound impact on the distribution of power in the international system. You know, we've been speaking about the digital divide for years and years now in the realm of cybersecurity.

I think it's fair to say the world is divided into “cyber-haves” and “cyber-have-nots.” Those who actually have the capacity to launch cyber-attacks and those who don't. That terminology “haves” and “have-nots” comes from the nuclear realm, the “nuclear haves” and the “nuclear have-nots” when it comes to nuclear weapons.

And my sense is that artificial intelligence, the development of artificial intelligence will create enormous opportunities, but also generate huge risks. And the Global Diplomacy institute, the program that we're designing, is going to be looking closely at these developments, exploring the emerging field of AI governance, the purpose of which is to try to maximize the opportunities that can be derived by this important powerful new technology while minimizing the risks.

Ebrahim Yes, and if I can add to that, we're seeing lots of instances, of course, where AI has already redefined power in the international system. And so we see, with every election, there's major concerns about misinformation and disinformation, including in the in the Canadian elections just last week, alongside major political decisions being revealed by use of social media, right tweets and short videos. And so that's all very much connected in terms of the speed with which information gets put out there as well as changed and manipulated. So that's just one.

But we also see that military strategy changes completely as a result of artificial intelligence. And we see this in Ukraine today. The fact that Ukraine has been able to hold out for so long is not because of its traditional kind of military power, but because of some degree of agility enabled by new forms of intelligence gathering.

And we have faculty here at Fletcher, who have been trained in the military, have taught in the military before, coming to Fletcher, and who are looking at this as part of their own research and work to try and understand how it's changing power dynamics in military arenas.

And then, of course, there's business, right? So, businesses have more data and knowledge of our individual preferences and behaviors than any kind of governmental or non-governmental entities. They also have much larger financial resources than most nation states. And so they’re, too, redefining power in the international system. Business plays an immense role, and it'll be incumbent on governments to actually work closely with business in order to try and address the challenges that nation states face.

And here, too, we have experts on cybersecurity at Fletcher, who are working on the ethics of AI, on the policy implications to try and make sense of some of these challenges.

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